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Abstract
The paper analyzes whether the political regime of a country inuences its involvement in
international trade. Firstly, we develop a theoretical model that predicts that autocracies
trade less than democracies. Secondly, we test the predictions of the model empirically using
a panel of more than 130 countries for the years 1962 to 2000. In contrast to the existing
literature, we use data on individual importing and exporting countries, rather than a dyadic
set-up. In line with the model, we nd that autocracies import substantially less than democ-
racies, even after controlling for ocial trade policies. This nding is very stable and does
not depend on a particular set-up or estimation technique.
JEL classication: F13; F14; O24; P45; P51
Keywords: international trade; democracy; autocracy; gravity model
1 Introduction
Is there a systematic relationship between economic and political liberalization? Does the political
regime of a country systematically aect how involved that country is in international trade?
The rst question has received a lot of recent attention in the economic literature with studies
of the determinants of democracy (Barro, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2005) and economic freedom
(Boockmann and Dreher, 2003; Bjﬁrnskov, 2006; Dreher and Rupprecht, 2007) as well as studies
of the relationship between democracy and economic freedom (Sturm and de Haan, 2003; Giavazzi
and Tabellini, 2005).1 The second, more specic question, is, in contrast, much less well researched
and the purpose of this paper is to provide some new answers to the question.
Existing knowledge about how political regimes may inuence international trade comes from
the political science literature. The two main papers in the literature both nd that democracy
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1Recently convergence and contagion trends of the two variables have also been studied (Nieswiadomy and
Strazicich, 2004; Gassebner et al., 2007). Furthermore, the inuence of both measures on macroeconomic variables
is attracting great interest (e.g. de Haan and Siermann, 1996; de Haan and Sturm, 2000; Sturm and de Haan, 2001;
Bjﬁrnskov, 2005).
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in one way or the other encourages trade. Manseld et al. (2000) stress the importance of the
congruence between the political regime of pairs of trading countries. They show that pairs
of democratic countries trade more than pairs consisting of a democracy and an autocracy.2
Milner and Kubota (2005) test whether democratization leads to trade policy liberalizations in a
sample of developing countries and show that democratic political institutions are one of the main
determinants of trade policy in these countries.
We add to this literature in two related ways. First, we argue that the theoretical foundations
of the previous studies (discussed in more detail in the next section) overlook the importance
of dierences in political accountability and how these dierences induce societies to build more
or less eective bureaucratic control mechanisms. Firstly, the lack of political accountability
makes it possible for political leaders to extract rents by imposing restrictions on international
trade. Moreover, within a hierarchical government structure, the lack of eective control and
monitoring mechanisms makes it less likely that political leaders choose to build a bureaucratic
structure that reduces trade-distorting red tape and other unocial trade barriers. Our theoretical
contribution, therefore, predicts that autocracies { societies with weak political accountability and
control structures { trade less with the rest of the world than democracies { societies with strong
political accountability and well-developed control structures { for two reasons. Democracy limits
the scope for rent extraction via trade restrictions and encourages institutional reforms that reduce
bureaucratic ineciencies.
Second, the existing empirical literature focuses on dyads of countries, and for this reason it is
not informative about how the political regime aect the trade performance of particular countries.
We add to the literature by asking if autocracies trade less than democracies and answering in the
armative. By doing so we move the focus away from dyads of countries to individual countries.
Furthermore, we use a much larger data set, with a longer time horizon and a deeper country
coverage than the previous studies. Finally, our empirical design allows us to demonstrate that
regime dierences in trade policy, while playing a role, cannot account for the observed dierences
in trade ows. Both the observation that autocracies trade less and the observation that they
trade less conditional on trade policy are consistent with our theoretical model.
Some authors have argued that international trade encourages democratization (e.g., Rigobon
and Rodrik, 2004, Lopez-Cordova and Meisner, 2005; O'Rourke and Taylor, 2007). This possibility
obviously is a concern when trying to estimate the impact of regime type on trade ows: countries
2Especially with their theoretical considerations and the inclusion of mixed and autocratic pairs they enhance
previous work by Morrow et al. (1998) who only include pairs of democracies in their empirical analysis. Morrow
and colleagues also nd that democracies trade more with each other.
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that are not involved in international trade could be autocracies for that reason. We attempt
to deal with this issues partly by allowing for unobserved country and time xed eects in our
empirical specication, partly by lagging the empirical indicators used to capture institutional
dierences between countries and partly by using instrumental variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model, contrast it
to existing models and develop the two hypothesizes that govern our empirical investigation. In
section 3, we develop our empirical strategy. In section 4, we present our main result. In section 5,
we discuss an extensive set of robustness checks, including IV estimates. In section 6, we provide
some concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Political Regimes and Trade Flows
In this section, we present a model that illuminates two new channels through which regime
types aect trade ows. One channel is the accountability channel: it is harder for citizens in
autocratic countries to hold their rulers accountable because of decient political institutions and,
as a consequence, rulers are relatively free to use trade taxes to extract rents. The other channel
is the bureaucracy channel: in autocratic societies the monitoring technology is weak and as a
consequence it is not in the interest of the ruler to build bureaucratic structures that weed out
red tape and other distortionary unocial trade obstructions introduced by the customs services.
Both of these channels suggest that, ceteris paribus, autocracies trade less than democracies and
that this continues to be true conditional on similar ocial trade policies.
Both of these channels are novel. The existing theoretical work on the link between political
regime types and trade ows or policy have either focused on the role of international agreements
or on the eect of an extension of the voting franchise.3 The rst approach is taken by Manseld
et al. (2000). They study how the incentives to enter a trade agreement dier between pairs of
countries with dierent political regimes. The dierence between democracy and autocracy is
that the executive in a democracy is constrained by the fact that any trade agreement must be
ratied by the legislature while the executive in an autocracy is free of such constraints. With
the additional assumptions that the legislature is more protectionist than the executive and that
trade negotiations take place sequentially as suggested by Putnam (1988), it follows that pairs of
3There is, of course, also a large literature on the political economy of trade protection (e.g., Hillman, 1982;
Mayer, 1984; Hillman, 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Aidt, 1997). The aim of this literature is to explain
trade protection within the context of competitive political systems often embodied in some form of democratic
institutions rather than to explain dierences between broad regimes types such as autocracy and democracy.
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democracies agree on a more lenient trade policy than mixed pairs of autocracies and democracies.
The reason is that a trade war is worse for a pair of democracies. While this prediction is robust
to a range of dierent bargaining structures, the model is mute on how much pairs of autocracies
trade relative to pairs democracies.4 Our model shares the notion that the critical dierence
between autocracies and democracies is the lack of eective constraints on the executive in the
former, but departs in three important ways. Firstly, we focus on a single country and thus
on unilateral trade policy. This allows us to make predictions about how democracy/autocracy
{ the regime type { aects trade ows and trade policy. Secondly, we focus explicitly on the
incentives that the threat of replacement provides for rulers and politicians in dierent types of
political regimes. Moreover, our model has the advantage that democracy and autocracy can be
conceptualized along a continuum controlled by three simple parameters. Thirdly, we combine an
explicit economic structure with a stylized political structure.
The other approach is taken by Milner and Kubota (2005). In particular, they maintain
that the link between democratization and freer trade is an enlargement of the constituency of
government that yields a shift of the median voter/supporter. Under autocracy the constituency
of government is typically a small group of individuals who are well-endowed with capital. Under
democracy with universal surage, the median voter is a worker with a low capital endowment.
In countries with an advantage in the production of labor-intensive goods (e.g., in developing
countries), the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem implies that the median voter benets from trade
liberalization both as a consumer and as a laborer. Our model is complementary to this. While
we ignore the eect that political transitions may have on the constituency of government and the
role that special interests may play both in an autocracy and in a democracy, we highlight that the
degree to which rulers/politicians can be held accountable for their actions and their incentives to
invest in \good" institutions vary systematically across regime types.
2.1 The economy
We consider a small open economy that produces two goods and has an innite time horizon.
Good 0 is a numeraire good produced with constant returns to scale with labor as the only input
and with an input-output coecient of 1. Good 1 is produced by labor and sector-specic capital.
4Dai (2002) criticizes the theoretical ndings of Manseld et al. (2000) and argues that their main proposition
depends on the preferences of the executives and that it is therefore not generally true that democratic pairs trade
more than mixed pairs. However, as pointed out by Manseld et al. (2002) this critique is only valid if the two-level
game structure of international negotiations is replaced by a structure in which the legislature of a democracy
negotiates directly with its counterpart or with the dictator if paired with an autocracy.
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The prot function is (p) where p is the domestic price of the good; p is the international price.
Domestic supply is @
@p
= y(p). Labour can move freely between sectors and consequently the wage
rate in the private sector is wp = 1.
The economy has two types of private agents. A tiny fraction of the population owns the sector-
specic capital and they spend all prot income on good 0. A continuum of workers with measure
1 earns wage income as each supplies one unit of labor inelastically to the labor market. Workers
consume both goods. Their utility function is x0 + u(x1). Optimization subject to the budget
constraint yields individual demands, x1 = d(p) and x0 = w
p   pd(p), and the indirect utility
v(p; wp). All utilities are discounted with the factor  2 (0; 1). Good 1 is traded internationally
and net imports are m (:) = d(p)  y (p).5
Trade ows are distorted by two types of policy interventions. Firstly, the ruler of the country
(the government) can levy a trade tax ﬁ on good 1. If ﬁ > 0 and good 1 is imported (exported)
then ﬁ is a tari (export subsidy) and if ﬁ < 0 and good 1 is imported (exported) then ﬁ is an
import subsidy (export tax). To be concrete, we shall refer to ﬁ as a tari and thus assume that
the country imports good 1.6 Secondly, the bureaucracy in charge of regulating international trade
can introduce various unocial trade barriers, which we shall refer to as red tape. The per-unit
cost of this is denoted by  and we can, therefore, dene the eective trade distortion, ﬁ + , as
the dierence between the domestic and the foreign price, i.e., ﬁ +  = p  p. The revenues from
the trade tax are
r(ﬁ; ) = ﬁm(ﬁ; ) (1)
where @m(ﬁ;)
@ﬁ
< 0, i.e., an increase in ﬁ pushes up the domestic price which reduces domestic
demand and increases domestic production. This means that r(ﬁ; ) is a Laer curve. Moreover,
since @m(ﬁ;)
@
< 0, red tape reduces the tax revenues raised for each value of ﬁ .
2.2 Politics
The society is governed by a ruler. The ruler can either be a dictator or a democratically elected
politician. We assume that the objective of the ruler is to extract rents from the economy which
are spend on the numeraire good and that his utility is uR = r(ﬁ; ).
7 The ruler must, however,
5We note that individual and aggregate demand for good 1 is the same.
6It will be clear from the objective function of the ruler that imports or exports are never subsidized. If good
1 is exported, the ruler will impose an export tax and if it is imported he will protect domestic production with a
tari. From the point of view of workers either is equally bad, so it is without loss of generality that we focus on
taris.
7We could extend the model to include a public good. In this case, the ruler can only keep the dierence between
what is spend on public goods and total tax revenues. All our results are essentially unaected and we prefer, for
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employ a bureaucracy to run the customs services. The task of the appointed bureaucrat is to
collect taris, which are handed over to the ruler, but in the process he might create red tape .
We assume that the bureaucrat benets from red tape, e.g., because it allows him to collect bribes
or because it gives the customs service more power. Red tape can either be low (absent) or high,
i.e.,  2

0; 
	
where  > 0. The rent that the bureaucrat gets from introducing red tape is B
where B is a positive constant. For simplicity, we assume that the bureaucrat only holds oce
for one period and that he consumes good 0 only.8 Red tape is not in the interest of the ruler as
it reduces trade ows (and hence tari revenues), so he might want to design incentives for the
bureaucrat to avoid red tape. We focus on two control instruments: monitoring and eciency
wages.
While we take monitoring to be an exogenous feature of the institutional environment, the
public sector wage is endogenous. The monitoring technology discovers malfeasance with proba-
bility 1  z in case of which the bureaucrat is immediately red and he loses his wage income from
the public sector and the rent from red tape and returns to the private sector where he receives
wp starting from next period onwards. With probability z, he is not discovered and he keeps the
public sector wage in the current period and any rent from creating red tape and returns to the
private sector in the subsequent period. We can write the expected utility of a bureaucrat who
introduces red tape in period t as
z
 
wt + B

+
wp
1  
(2)
and that of a bureaucrat who refrains from doing so as wt +
wp
1  where w is the public sector
wage.9 The second control instrument is the public sector wage which is endogenous and designed
by the ruler and nanced out of tari revenues. As suggested by Becker and Stigler (1974), the
ruler may oer an eciency wage that eectively ensures that no red tape is introduced:
we =
z
1  z
B: (3)
Faced with the public sector wage w, the optimal choice of the bureaucrat in oce in any period
simplicity, to stick to Leviathan assumption as in Brennan and Buchanan (1980). More importantly, we do not
want to assume that the intrinsic objectives of \rulers" in autocracies and democracies are dierent; rather we
want to argue that it is the quality of institutions that forces democratically elected rulers to behave dierently
from dictators. There is ample evidence that rulers in particular in societies with weak institutions can extract
signicant rents (see, e.g., Olken, 2006).
8This is not important for the results and it is straight forward to extend the model to allow bureaucrats to hold
oce forever.
9To ensure a positive supply of bureaucrats we assume that B > 1
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t can be summarized as follows:
t (wt) =
8><
>:
0 if wt  w
e
 if wt < w
e
: (4)
In the absence of moderating incentives, rulers design a trade policy (ﬁ) and a wage structure
for the bureaucracy (wt) to extract the maximum rent each period. To avoid this, societies
develop political institutions that moderate the behavior of rulers. These institutions partly allow
citizens to hold their rulers accountable and to replace the incumbent if he extracts too much
rent and partly improves the monitoring capacity of the government (z). In a fully democratic
society, elections serve the rst purpose (Ferejohn, 1986; Persson and Tabellini, 2000, chapter
3), but even in autocracies and dictatorships, rulers may be constrained by the threat of a coup
or a popular revolt (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). Formally, at the beginning of each period,
workers announce a performance standard that the ruler has to satisfy to get \reappointed" at the
end of the period. Workers base their performance standard on the level of utility they get from
the policies implemented by the ruler and the bureaucrat. We denote the performance standard
announced at the beginning of period t by bvt. The standard requires the ruler to introduce a policy
package (ﬁt; wt) that yields at least the utility level bvt in order to be considered for reappointment.
We assume that only workers have political voice (set standards). This assumption is made for
simplicity. We can think of it as a situation in which the ruler needs to please the masses; an
assumption that makes sense in a democracy, but also in many cases in autocracies.10
In a well-functioning democracy, a ruler (politician) who complies with the standard is guaran-
teed reappointment while a ruler (politician) who does not comply is certain of dismissal. These
promises are, however, not equally credible in all societies, and in autocracies or dysfunctional
democracies intimidation of the opposition, electoral fraud etc. can signicantly reduce the degree
of accountability. We make a distinction between two types of governance failures:
Denition 1 (p-failure) Workers can only promise to reappoint a ruler who satises bvt in period
t with probability p 2 [0; 1].
Denition 2 (q-failure) Workers can only promise to dismiss a ruler who does not satisfy bvt in
period t with probability 1  q 2 [0; 1].
10The model could be extended to allow the owners of specic capital to lobby (oer bribes to) the ruler. This
could be done along the lines of Aidt and Dutta (2004), but a formal analysis would distract from our current
purposes.
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A p-failure arises when workers cannot promise for sure to reward good behavior with reap-
pointment. This type of problem, typically, arises in situations with volatile voter turnout or
general apathy among the electorate, but otherwise strong democratic institutions. A q-failure
arises when citizens cannot, in all cases, dismiss under-performing rulers, and a society with q
close to 1 can be interpreted as a dictatorship. Together with the monitoring technology z, these
failures capture exogenous variations in the quality of institutions and, as we shall see, allow us
to dene the dierence between autocracies with weak institutions (low p, high q, high z) and
democracies with strong institutions (high p, low q, low z).
The interaction between rulers, bureaucrats and workers can be summarized as follows. At
the beginning of each period, a new bureaucrat enters oce and workers announce a performance
standard. Next, the ruler decides on the tari and the public wage for the period. After that the
bureaucrat decides how much red tape to introduce and the monitoring technology determines if
he is red prematurely. At the end of the period, workers observe their utility levels, judge the
performance of the ruler against the utility standard and decide if they want to reappoint the
incumbent ruler or not. This together with random events, as captured by p and q, determines
whether the incumbent is, in fact, replaced by another ruler. After this the sequence of events is
repeated.
2.3 Analysis and Results
Given a sequence of standards fbvtg1t=0, the ruler faces the choice between complying and hoping
to stay in power (which allows him to collect rents in the future) or not complying and collecting
the maximum rent now.
If the ruler decides not to comply at time t (i.e., to deviate (D)), he sets

ﬁDt ; w
D
t
	
= argmax
ﬁt;wt
r(ﬁt;  (wt))  E(wt): (5)
In doing so, he anticipates how the public wage aects the choices of the bureaucrat. It is costly
to provide wage incentives and the expected wage bill is
E(wt) =
8><
>:
zwt if wt < w
e
wt if wt  w
e
: (6)
The bureaucrat acknowledges that he only has to pay the wage if the bureaucrat is not discovered
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adding red tape. Clearly, either wDt = 0 or w
D
t = w
e is optimal. In the former case, the optimal
tari is
ﬁD1 = argmax
ﬁt
r(ﬁt; ) (7)
and the rent is r
 
ﬁD1; 

for all t, and in the later case, it is
ﬁD2 = argmax
ﬁt
r(ﬁt; 0)  w
e (8)
and the rent is r(ﬁD2; 0) we for all t. In either case, the workers attempt to replace the ruler at
time t+ 1 but with probability q fail to do so. The ruler's expected payo is
Vt(D) = max

r(ﬁD1; ); r(ﬁD2; 0)  we
	
+ qV t+1; (9)
where V t+1 is the continuation value of holding oce at the beginning of period t+1. The optimal
deviation policy depends on the quality of the monitoring institutions as described by the rst
Lemma.
Lemma 1 (The Optimal Deviation Policy) Let
RD 
r(ﬁD2; 0)  r(ﬁD1; )
B
> 0
Then
1. If z1 z  R
D, then
 
ﬁD1; 0

is optimal.
2. If z1 z < R
D, then
 
ﬁD2; we

is optimal.
Proof. The Lemma follows from a straight forward comparison of the net rents collected by
the ruler in each case using equation (3)
We note that the quality of monitoring (z) eectively determines if it is in the interest of the
ruler to maintain strong wage incentives for the bureaucrat or not. If the monitoring technology
is eective (z is low), it is cheap to pay eciency wages and optimal to weed out red tape even
for a ruler that has decided to disregard the demands of his citizens. If, on the other hand, the
monitoring technology is ineective (z is high), then it is better for the ruler to accept red tape
and focus on maximizing tari revenues subject to that.
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If the ruler decides to comply in period t, he selects the policy package

ﬁCt ; w
C
t
	
= argmax
ﬁ;w
r(ﬁt; (wt))  E(wt) (10)
subject to v(ﬁt; t)  bvt. Again, the ruler either sets wCt = 0or wCt = we and we note that
ﬁC1(bvt) = argmax
ﬁt
r(ﬁt; ) (11)
subject to v(ﬁt; )  bvt is optimal in the former case and that
ﬁC2(bvt) = argmax
ﬁt
r(ﬁt; 0)  w
e (12)
subject to v(ﬁt; 0)  bvt is optimal in the later. Since v(ﬁ; ) is decreasing in ﬁ , the ruler must
reduce the tari below the respective rent maximizing levels to satisfy the constraints. The
expected payo is
Vt(C) = max

r(ﬁC1(bvt); ); r(ﬁC2(bvt); 0)  we	+ pV t+1. (13)
As shown by the next Lemma, the quality of the monitoring institutions also plays a key role for
the choice between the two possible compliance strategies.
Lemma 2 (Within Period Optimal Compliance). Suppose that bvt  maxv  ﬁD1;  ; v(ﬁD2; 0)	
and let
RCt 
r
 
ﬁC2 (bvt) ; 0  r  ﬁC1 (bvt) ; 
B
> 0:
Then
1. If z1 z  R
C
t ; then the optimal compliance policy is
 
ﬁC1 (bvt) ; 0.
2. If z1 z < R
C
t ; then the optimal compliance policy is
 
ﬁC2 (bvt) ; we.
Proof. The Lemma follows from a straight forward comparison of the net rents collected by
the ruler in each case using equation (3)
The sequence of performance standards is incentive compatible if and only if at all t
Vt(C)  Vt(D). (14)
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Workers select the sequence of standards that yields the highest lifetime utility subject to incentive
compatibility. The structure of the model implies that the optimal choice is stationary; that is,
bvt = bv for all t where bv is dened by
max

r(ﬁC1(bv); ); r(ﬁC2(bv); 0)  we	 (15)
=
1  p
1  q
max

r(ﬁD1; ); r(ﬁD2; 0)  we
	
.
Incentive compatibility requires that p > q; otherwise, institutions are so bad that no ruler would
ever comply with any standard other than the rent maximizing one. It is also clear from equation
(15) that workers' welfare is increasing in the quality of institutions, i.e., that @bv

@p
> 0 and @bv

@q
< 0.
We are interested in why the volume of international trade is dierent in autocracies and
democracies. To study this, we shall make a comparison between two extremes. At one end of
the spectrum, we have a society with well-functioning democratic institutions and an eective
monitoring technology: p = 1, q = 0and z = 0. At the other end, we have a society with seriously
dysfunctional institutions: p  q and z = 1. We shall refer to the former as a \democracy" and
to the later as an \autocracy" acknowledging that in the real world most societies fall somewhere
in between these extremes. The following Proposition states the main implications of the model.
Proposition 1 (Regime Type and the Volume of Trade).
1. The eective trade distortion is higher in autocracies than in democracies and as a conse-
quence, autocracies trade less with the rest of the world than democracies.
2. For given ocial trade policy ( ﬁ), autocracies trade less with the rest of the world than
democracies because of dierences in red tape and other unocial trade distortions.
Proof. Consider an autocracy with p  q and z = 1. Lemma 1 implies that the optimal
deviation entails wD = 0 and ﬁD = ﬁD1, while Lemma 2 implies that the optimal compliance
policy is wC = 0 and ﬁC = ﬁC1 for all t. However, since p  q, equation (15) implies that
incentive compatibility fails and so, the ruler implements ﬁ = ﬁD1 = ﬁC1(v
 
ﬁD1; 

) and w = 0
each period until he is replaced by a new ruler who behaves likewise. Workers get v
 
ﬁD1; 

and
the eective trade distortion is ﬁD1+ . Consider, next, a democracy with p = 1, q = 0 and z = 0.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that wD = wC = we and that ﬁD = ﬁD2 and ﬁC = ﬁC2 at all t. The
eective trade distortion is ﬁC2. Let v denote equilibrium utility of a worker. Equation (15)
implies that the best incentive compatible standard under democracy v entails higher utility
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than v
 
ﬁD1; 

. It follows that ﬁD1 + > ﬁ
C2(v) and thus, as stated in part 1 of the Proposition,
that autocracies trade less. Part 2 follows from the observation that autocracies allow red tape
while democracies do not
The rst part of the Proposition shows that autocracies trade less than democracies. The source
of this result is dierences in the quality of institutions. These dierences aect trade ows through
two channels. First, autocracies have weak political institutions as captured by p and q. This allows
autocratic rulers to extract more rents than politicians in a democracy. The implication is higher
trade taxes under autocratic rule and consequently less imports (or exports). An improvement
in accountability (better institutions) reduces trade taxes and encourages more trade. Second,
autocracies also have weak monitoring institutions (as captured by z). As a consequence of this,
autocratic rulers have little incentive to weed out red tape and other distortionary unocial trade
obstructions introduced by the bureaucrats in the customs services.11 In contrast, in a democracy
with a more eective monitoring system, it is cheap to pay eciency wages. It is optimal for
rulers to enhance institutional quality of the bureaucracy and this reduces red tape and encourages
trade ows. The second part of the Proposition shows that precisely because of dierences in the
incentives for rulers to pay eciency wages in the two types of societies, autocracies trade less
than democracies for a given ocial trade policy.
3 Empirical Specication
We want to estimate the relationship between the political regime of a country and its involvement
in international trade thereby testing the two implications of our model listed in Proposition 1. To
this end, we employ a standard gravity model of trade for a sample of up to 130 countries covering
the years from 1962 to 2000. As the dependent variable, we use real import of country i from
country e in year t rather than bilateral trade ows between pairs of countries.12 Through this
choice, we avoid what Baldwin (2006) calls the \silver-medal of gravity mistakes"; the problem
that regressions with average bilateral trade ows as the dependent variable are subject to a sizable
upward bias when trade is unbalanced. More specically, our baseline specication is the following
panel model
11This notion corresponds to the ndings of Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007). Focusing on the
Ukraine, they nd that although public sector employees receive approximately 30% lower wages as compared to
those in the private sector their level of consumer expenditures and asset holdings is essentially identical. This
indicates that bureaucrats receive \unocial payments" of sizable amounts.
12Data on nominal import ows comes from Feenstra (2000) and are converted into real import ows using the
US GDP deator. This is possible because nominal world trade is measured in dollars.
12
ln(real import)iet = 1regimeit 1 + 2regimeet 1 + 3ln(gdpit) + (16)
4ln(gdpet) + 5landlocked iet + 6ln(distanceiet) +
Xiet + i + e + t + "iet;
where (real import)iet is real imports of country i from country e in year t, regimeit 1 and
regimeet 1 are lagged values of particular measures of regime type (democracy/autocracy) of the
importing and exporting country, respectively (to be discussed below), gdpit and gdpet are real
GDP of the importing and exporting country, respectively, landlocked iet is a dummy variable tak-
ing the value of 1 if at least one trading partner is land locked, distanceiet is the distance between
the most populated cities of the trading pair and "iet is an error term with zero mean. The vector
Xiet contains a number of dummy variables that measure colonial ties. In particular, the following
variables are included: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the two trading partners share the same
ocial language (common language), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the trading partners have a
common border (common border), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the trading partners were ever
in a colonial relationship (colonial ties), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the trading partners share
a common colonizer post 1945 (common colonizer), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the trading
partners were in a colonial relationships post 1945 (colony post 1945 ), and a dummy taking the
value of 1 if the trading partners are or were in the past the same nation (same country). Our
choice of gravity variables follows Rose (2004) and we have no interest in these variables except
as control variables.13;14 We list the sources and exact denitions of all the variables used in our
analysis in Table 5.
It is important to notice that our panel model allows us to estimate the eect of regime type
on trade ows separately for an importing and for an exporting country. This allows us to test
the theoretical implications of our model which would not be possible within the pair wise set-up
of Morrow et al. (1998), Manseld et al. (2000) and others.
Given the diculty of obtaining reliable quantitative measures of regime type, we use three
dierent indicators as proxies. They capture dierent aspects of the institutional environment and
all have their own aws and advantages. The rst indicator is the Polity IV index constructed by
Gurr et al. (2003).15 The index is measured on a scale from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy).
13For further details on the gravity model, we refer to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
14However, we may note that they are all signicant and have the correct sign.
15The Polity IV index or more accurately the \polity2" index summarizes dierent indicators of political authority
13
In order to make the results obtained with this indicator comparable to those obtained with the
two other indicators that we use, we re-code the variable on a scale from 1 to 21 with higher
values indicating that a society is more autocratic. The second indicator is the average of two
indicators called \Political Rights" and \Civil Liberties" constructed by Freedom House (2006).
The resulting indicator runs from 1 to 7 with higher values indicating that a society is more
autocratic. The third indicator is the regime type indicator constructed by Alvarez et al. (1996)
and Przeworski et al. (2000) and updated until 2000 by Cheibub and Ghandi (2004). Democracy
is essentially dened as a political system in which incumbents can lose elections and are forced
to comply with the results of elections. More specically, a country is classied as a democracy if
the executive and the legislature is lled through contested elections, where more than one party
has a chance of winning. The resulting dummy variable takes the value of 1 for autocracies and
zero for democracies.
It is hard to say which of the indicators is the \best". They have all drawn critique. The Polity
IV index has been criticized for the way values are assigned to its various subcomponents. Freedom
House sometimes draw critique because its indicators are completely survey based. Przeworski's
regime type indicator uses the most clear-cut denition of the three, but has the disadvantage
of being a dummy variable without \scales of grey". However, the three indicators focus on
slightly dierent aspects of political institutions and can therefore perhaps best be viewed as
complements rather than substitute measures of democracy/autocracy. The Polity IV index is
basically a measure of political competition that ignores how widely extended the voting franchise
is and other aspects of popular participation in politics.16 The Freedom House index focuses
more on political rights and civil liberties than on de facto political competition and participation.
Przeworski et al. (2000) focus on a combination of political participation and contestability of
political power. The complementarity of the three measures in another good reason to use all
three indicators in the analysis. Finally, as argued by Milner and Kubota (2005), it takes time for
changes in political institutions to aect trade patterns and the eects of democratic transitions are
likely to be long-lasting. For this reason, we enter the three institutional indicators either with a
one year lag or as the average of the ve preceding years. This also mitigates potential endogeneity
problems arising if international trade encourages the development of democratic institutions.
patterns to measure three key aspects of a country's political system. The three aspects are: i) competitiveness
and openness in the process of executive recruitment; ii) constraints on the chief executive and iii) competitiveness
and regulation of political participation. A weighted sum of the components is used to construct two summary
variables, measuring democracy on a scale from 0 to 10 and autocracy from -10 to 0. The Polity IV index is the
sum of these two sub-indexes.
16See Aidt and Eterovic (2007) for a discussion of this.
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All regressions include xed eects for the importing and exporting country (i, e) as well as
year xed eects (t). This is a variant of the approach adopted by Feenstra (2004) who introduced
the notion of country-specic eects as multilateral resistance terms. The country eects control
for unobserved country characteristics that are xed over time with the subtlety that we allow
these unobservable eects to dier between importers and exporters, even if the same country is
involved in import and export. The importance of correcting for these importer, exporter and
time xed eects is pointed out by Baltagi et al. (2003) as well as Baldwin (2006) who calls the
omission of these eects the \gold-medal of gravity mistakes".
The baseline model allows us to test the rst implication of the model, i.e., that autocratic
countries trade less. The second implication of our model is that autocratic countries trade less
conditional on ocial trade policy. To test this, we need to extend the baseline model with a
proxy for trade policy. Given the many dierent forms that trade restrictions can take and the
well-known diculties in measuring trade policy (see, e.g., Milner and Kubota, 2005), we opt to
include a multidimensional index. In particular, we employ the restriction sub-index from the
KOF Index of Globalization (see Dreher, 2006). This restriction index combines information on
non-tari import barriers, mean tari rates, other taxes on international trade, and capital account
restrictions. It ranges from 1 to 10 with higher values indicating fewer restrictions.
4 Main Empirical Results
The results of the estimation of equation (16) are shown in Table 1. We may begin by noting
that all control variables have the correct sign and are highly signicant with the exception of
the landlockedness dummy variable. Given the numerous existing gravity studies, we shall refrain
from interpreting the coecients on these covariates.17
More importantly, it is apparent that all three regime type indicators yield the same result:
autocracies trade signicantly less. The results have one more factor in common. The estimated
coecients on the regime type indicators are largest in the specications that use ve years aver-
ages. This indicates that the eect of regime type on trade is persistent; a nding that is in line
with that of Milner and Kubota (2005). Furthermore, it suggests that changes in the trade ows
take place gradually after a regime change.
Given its dichotomous nature, Przeworski's regime type indicator is the easiest to interpret.
According to this indicator, autocracies have 23.7-28.6% less imports and 20.2-21.8% less exports,
17See, e.g., Rose (2004) for interpretations.
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ceteris paribus. Both the Polity IV and the Freedom House index are measured on an ordinal
scale. On the 1 to 21 points scale of the Polity IV index, a one point move towards autocracy
reduces imports by 1.8-2.3% and exports by 1.2-1.4%, ceteris paribus. This means that if a
hypothetical country were to undergo a transition from full democracy to complete autocracy, it
would lose about 36% of its imports and about 24% of its exports. On the 1 to 7 scale of the
Freedom House index, a hypothetical country that went through the same transition would result
lose about 33% of its imports and about 30% of its exports. To give a more concrete example.
Imagine that the political regime of Switzerland was transformed into that of Myanmar in the
year 2000. The consequence would be a reduction of imports and exports of 29.6% and 20.4%
according to the Polity IV index and 33% and 30% according to Freedom House index, ceteris
paribus. Although there are dierences, it is striking how similar the results obtained with the
three dierent indicators are.
Milner and Kubota (2005) show in a sample of developing countries that democracies have
lower tari rates than autocracies. Thus, the results reported in Table 1 { autocracies trade less {
could simply be a result of this eect. To investigate this, we add the restriction index, introduced
in the previous section, to the specication in equation (16) and re-run the estimation. The results
are shown in Table 2. Not surprisingly, the restriction index has a positive impact on trade ows
and is highly signicant for importing countries. This indicates that a country with few trade
restrictions imports more. For exporting countries, the coecients on the restriction index is
positive and signicant in some specications. This could be interpreted as a \reward", i.e., a
country exports more if it lowers its import barriers. However, one should not read too much into
this result.
More importantly, we see from Table 2 that the main nding from the baseline model persists:
autocracies trade less, even after controlling for dierences in trade policy. The coecients on
the Polity IV index and on Przeworski's regime type indicator are somewhat lower than those
reported in Table 1, but they are still highly signicant. The coecients on the Freedom House
index remain virtually unchanged. This nding shows that the tari channel, as identied by
Milner and Kubota (2005), is not the only transmission mechanism. Our model points to two
alternative transmission channels (the accountability channel and the bureaucracy channel) and
our ndings are consistent with the presence of both.
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5 Robustness Analysis and IV Estimates
To see whether the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 are sensitive to changes in the specication
and estimation method, we have conducted an extensive set of tests of robustness. We use the
specication including the restriction index as the baseline (as reported in Table 2).
Firstly, we extend the model with additional control variables that have been proposed by,
e.g., Rose (2004) as determinants of international trade ows. These variables are: log of GDP
per capita, log of population, a dummy variable indicating a common currency, a dummy variable
indicating a generalized system of preferences, a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the trading
partners are members in the same regional trading agreement, a dummy indicating WTO/GATT
membership, and, nally, all of the above at the same time.18 The results of this are presented
in Table 3. To save space, we only display the coecients on the regime type indicators (autoc)
in the table. We see that the results are not much aected by the inclusion of these additional
variables. The signicance level remains unchanged and the changes in the size of the coecients
are minuscule.
Secondly, to further elaborate on the robustness of the baseline results, we have employed
dierent estimation techniques that reduce the risk that outliers are driving the results. Again,
the specication of Table 2 is used as the starting point and the results are presented in the top
of Table 4 and we only report the results for the regime type indicators. As a rst step, we re-
estimated the model using re-weighted least squares (RLS). This robust regression technique weighs
observations in an iterative process. Starting with OLS, estimates are obtained through weighted
least squares where observations with relatively large residuals get smaller weights. We see that the
coecients remain highly signicant although their magnitudes are somewhat reduced. Comparing
the coecients reported in Tables 2 and 4, we see that the coecients on the political regime
indicator of importing countries are approximately halved, while the coecients for exporting
countries change only minimally. Next, we used the least absolute value estimator, which minimizes
the sum of the absolute deviations from the median.19 Although the magnitude of the coecient
on the regime type indicator of importing countries is somewhat smaller, the results are comparable
to those obtained with the RLS estimator and the regime type eect remains highly signicant.
Thirdly, we have altered the sample and tested whether this has consequences for the results.
First, we have extended the sample up to the year 2003 using trade data taken from the United
18Due to perfect collinearity it is not possible to include log(GDP), log(GDP per capita) and log(population) in
the same regression. The results in Table 3 show the outcome without population. However, the results do not
change if log(GDP per capita) is substituted by log(population).
19This is also known as mean absolute deviation (MAD) or L1 norm regression.
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Nations Statistical Division Commodity Trade Data Base (Comtrade, 2006).20 Doing so does not
change the results much. Second, Milner and Kubota (2005) focus on developing countries only and
to allow for a more direct comparison, we restricted the sample to include only developing countries,
either as importers or as exporters, respectively.21 We see that this reduces the magnitude of the
estimated eect of regime type on trade, but with the exception of one regression, the eect
remains signicant. So, even within developing countries, more autocratic countries trade less
conditional on trade policy.
Fourthly, although we use lags of the three regime type indicators, this might not be enough to
avoid all endogeneity problems and one concern about our results is that they may be contaminated
by feedback eects from trade to democracy. As argued by, e.g., Lopez-Cordova and Meisner
(2005), involvement in international trade may foster democracy. If so, the coecients on the
regime type indicators reported in Table 1 to 4 may be biased. To deal with this issue, we have re-
estimated the model using instrumental variables (IV) techniques. In choosing the instruments, we
largely follow the existing literature. Milner and Kubota (2005) use the average age of the parties in
the political system as an instrument for regime type.22 As a second instrument, we use an ordinal
index of checks and balances constructed by Keefer and Stasavage (2003). Finally, we use the
percentage of votes cast in line with the Group of 7 (G7) countries in the United Nations General
Assembly in the IV regressions. Dreher and Sturm (2006) show that more democratic countries
vote more in line with the G7. We contend that neither of these variables are correlated with
the error term in equation (16). We report a summary of the results using all three instruments
simultaneously in Table 4. In all specications, the rst stage F-statistic, indicating the relevance
of the instruments, easily passes the threshold of 10 as proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). We
also report the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen test for over-identication and note that the test fails
to reject at the 10 percent level in all, but one, specication. All specications basically show the
same pattern, namely that our previous results if anything under-estimated the eect of autocracy
on imports. All coecients on the regime type indicators for importing countries remain signicant
at the one percent level and signicantly increase their (absolute) size. In contrast, the coecients
on the regime type indicators for exporting countries hardly change their size but are no longer
signicant at conventional levels, with the exception of the specication with the ve year average
20Feenstra's (2000) data is based on this data source.
21We follow the WTO convention of coding the following countries as developed: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechten-
stein, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA. All other
countries are coded as developing countries.
22The source for this data is Beck et al. (2001).
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of the Freedom House index. Based on the IV estimates, we conclude that our previous results can
be interpreted as a lower bound of the eect of autocracy on imports, while our baseline results
on the impact of regime type on exports cannot be considered robust.
6 Conclusions
The question that motivates this paper is a simple one: does the political regime of a country
systematically aect how involved the country is in international trade? Our theoretical model
provides two reasons why the answer to this question is likely to be yes. In contrast to previous
theoretical work, we argue that the root cause of regime dierences in trade ows is dierences in
political accountability. These dierences aect trade ows directly through the impact on trade
taxes (which are more prevalent in autocracies than in democracies), but they also work through
a more subtle indirect channel. Rulers of societies with weak accountability institutions have
no incentive to build up bureaucratic control structures that reduce red tape and other largely
unobserved trade distortions introduced by the customs service. As a consequence, the theory
suggests that not only do autocracies trade less but that they trade less conditional on ocial
trade policy.
We test the implications of the model within the framework of a standard gravity model
of international trade. This design allows us to distinguish between the eects of the political
regime of an importing and of an exporting country. We nd that autocracies trade signicantly
less than democracies, even after controlling for dierences in trade policy. The magnitude of
the eect is substantial: autocracies have between 4.3% and 23.3% less imports and between
16.1% and 19.7% less exports, ceteris paribus. These results are robust to a battery of dierent
estimation techniques and our instrumental variables estimates suggest that the baseline estimate
for the impact of autocracy on imports can be considered a lower bound, while the baseline
estimate for the impact on export cannot be considered robust. Overall, our analysis shows that
autocracies import less (and maybe export less) and that this eect is not driven by dierences
in trade policy. We propose that it can be explained by systematic dierences in the degree of
political accountability. In other words, a democracy trade more with the rest of the world because
democratically elected politicians are less tempted to use trade taxes to extract rents and because
these politicians face the right incentives to build institutions that weed out trade-distorting red
tape in the customs service.
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Table 1: OLS Results { Dependent Variable: log of real imports
Polity IV Freedom House Przeworski et al.
autocracyi t 1 -0.018
 { -0.055 { -0.237 {
-17.56 -11.21 -16.33
autocracye t 1 -0.012
 { -0.050 { -0.202 {
-12.03 -10.21 -14.17
average autocracyi (t-1{t-5) { -0.023
 { -0.079 { -0.286
-18.53 -12.56 -16.09
average autocracye (t-1{t-5) { -0.014
 { -0.046 { -0.218
-11.07 -7.15 -12.48
log GDPi 1.327
 1.299 1.260 1.209 1.318 1.272
67.33 58.22 50.15 39.72 67.13 57.07
log GDPe 1.277
 1.318 1.230 1.287 1.266 1.302
66.76 61.37 50.53 43.46 66.71 61.08
landlocked -0.069 0.031 -0.168 -0.066 -0.100 -0.002
-2.04 0.82 -4.72 -1.62 -2.97 -0.06
common language 0.421 0.390 0.419 0.374 0.431 0.399
33.12 29.49 30.85 26.00 34.44 30.32
common border 0.468 0.386 0.369 0.250 0.430 0.341
17.96 13.97 12.84 7.90 16.56 12.35
colonial ties 0.596 0.551 0.614 0.564 0.641 0.599
18.32 17.32 18.00 16.83 20.23 19.28
common colonizer 0.636 0.545 0.556 0.448 0.664 0.591
31.37 24.36 25.20 17.46 33.15 26.47
colony post 1945 1.123 1.029 1.003 0.931 1.082 0.985
27.04 25.52 23.13 22.14 26.62 24.83
same country 0.917 0.809 0.738 0.359 0.898 0.783
25.32 20.37 17.43 6.97 24.75 19.60
log distance -1.021 -0.998 -1.096 -1.068 -1.041 -1.021
-164.59 -152.55 -165.70 -148.52 -170.99 -157.87
Observations 188,163 140,393 154,975 106,446 195,507 144,585
Importers 126 122 133 128 133 128
Exporters 126 123 133 129 133 129
R-squared 0.7247 0.7421 0.7317 0.7541 0.7259 0.7424
Notes: average autocracy(t-1{t-5) represents the average of the ve years prior to the observation;
i and e indicate importing and exporting country, respectively. Polity IV is the Variable \poliy2"
from Gurr et al. (2003) and is transformed to run from 1 to 21, Freedom House is the average of
the \civil liberties" and \political rights" indicators from Freedom House (2006) and ranges from 1
to 7, higher numbers reect higher levels of autocracy in both cases. Przeworski et al. is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 for autocratic states. It is taken from Alvarez et al. (1996) and
Przeworski et al. (2000) with updates until 2000 coming from Cheibub and Ghandi (2004).
All regressions contain importer-, exporter- and time-specic xed eects all of which are signi-
cant at the 1% level. // indicates signicance at the 10/5/1-% signicance level; t-statistics
are given in italics below the coecient.
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Table 2: OLS Results with Restriction Index{ Dependent Variable: log of real imports
Polity IV Freedom House Przeworski et al.
autocracyi t 1 -0.013
 { -0.054 { -0.161 {
-8.98 -8.54 -8.42
autocracye t 1 -0.013
 { -0.063 { -0.180 {
-9.13 -10.12 -9.59
average autocracyi (t-1{t-5) { -0.019
 { -0.082 { -0.215
-11.94 -10.29 -9.82
average autocracye (t-1{t-5) { -0.013
 { -0.055 { -0.179
-8.44 -6.91 -8.31
restriction indexi 0.109
 0.104 0.123 0.138 0.118 0.109
10.71 10.12 11.86 12.46 11.61 10.61
restriction indexe 0.020
 0.022 0.015 -0.014 0.026 0.020
1.95 2.16 1.48 -1.28 2.57 1.95
log GDPi 1.185
 1.152 1.134 1.051 1.168 1.117
41.95 40.39 36.92 28.50 41.34 39.01
log GDPe 1.316
 1.339 1.268 1.253 1.298 1.315
47.50 48.15 41.98 34.54 46.99 47.34
landlocked -0.077 -0.053 -0.066 -0.063 -0.090 -0.096
-1.45 -0.97 -1.22 -1.13 -1.69 -1.76
common language 0.395 0.356 0.388 0.307 0.392 0.352
22.99 20.78 22.02 16.64 22.78 20.38
common border 0.137 0.109 0.131 0.154 0.112 0.083
3.91 3.08 3.63 4.05 3.17 2.32
colonial ties 0.442 0.417 0.402 0.369 0.434 0.411
10.82 10.74 9.61 8.99 10.58 10.53
common colonizer 0.333 0.318 0.330 0.266 0.365 0.345
11.58 10.75 11.25 8.39 12.52 11.41
colony post 1945 0.900 0.919 0.876 0.873 0.911 0.913
12.68 13.60 12.09 12.25 12.47 13.12
same country 0.668 0.547 0.608 0.267 0.681 0.551
13.42 10.53 11.84 4.63 13.57 10.49
log distance -1.095 -1.050 -1.107 -1.063 -1.107 -1.063
-132.76 -126.43 -131.96 -120.51 -134.16 -127.26
Observations 92,417 77,660 86,640 62,131 94,050 78,827
Importers 75 74 77 75 77 75
Exporters 75 75 77 76 77 76
R-squared 0.7247 0.7421 0.7369 0.7562 0.7337 0.7423
Notes: See notes to Table 1 for the explanation of the autocracy data. The trade restriction index
is taken from Dreher (2006).
All regressions contain importer-, exporter- and time-specic xed eects all of which are signi-
cant at the 1% level.
// indicates signicance at the 10/5/1-% signicance level; t-statistics are given in italics
below the coecient.
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Table 3: OLS Results Additional Variables { Dependent Variable: log of real imports
Additional
Variable(s)
Polity IV Freedom House Przeworski et al.
log GDP autoci t 1 -0.012
 { -0.055 { -0.159 {
per capita autoce t 1 -0.013
 { -0.065 { -0.178 {
(i and e) autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.019
 { -0.079 { -0.214
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.013
 { -0.053 { -0.179
log population autoci t 1 -0.012
 { -0.055 { -0.159 {
(i and e) autoce t 1 -0.013
 { -0.065 { -0.178 {
autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.019
 { -0.079 { -0.214
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.013
 { -0.053 { -0.179
common autoci t 1 -0.015
 { -0.054 { -0.173 {
currency autoce t 1 -0.015
 { -0.060 { -0.188 {
autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.020
 { -0.083 { -0.232
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.015
 { -0.052 { -0.197
generalized autoci t 1 -0.015
 { -0.053 { -0.173 {
system of autoce t 1 -0.015
 { -0.060 { -0.189 {
preferences autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.020
 { -0.082 { -0.233
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.015
 { -0.051 { -0.198
regional autoci t 1 -0.014
 { -0.053 { -0.173 {
trade autoce t 1 -0.014
 { -0.059 { -0.188 {
agreement autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.019
 { -0.081 { -0.228
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.014
 { -0.050 { -0.193
WTO autoci t 1 -0.013
 { -0.054 { -0.160 {
membership autoce t 1 -0.013
 { -0.063 { -0.179 {
(i and e) autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.019
 { -0.082 { -0.215
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.013
 { -0.054 { -0.178
all of the autoci t 1 -0.014
 { -0.054 { -0.170 {
abovea autoce t 1 -0.014
 { -0.060 { -0.186 {
autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.019
 { -0.077 { -0.226
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.014
 { -0.048 { -0.192
Notes: autoc t 1 represents the one year lagged autocracy score while autoc (t-1{t-5) is the average
of the ve years prior to the observation; i and e stand for importing and exporting country,
respectively; (i and e) indicate separate variables for importing and exporting countries. See
notes to Table 1 for the explanation of the autocracy data. Only the results for the autocracy
variables are shown in the table. However, the base specication is taken from Table 2.
All regressions contain importer-, exporter- and time-specic xed eects all of which are signi-
cant at the 1% level.
// indicates signicance at the 10/5/1-% signicance level.
a Due to perfect collinearity population is excluded in the estimation.
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Table 4: Results Alternative Techniques and Samples { Dependent Variable: log of real imports
Technique /
Sample
Polity IV Freedom House Przeworski et al.
reweighted autoci t 1 -0.008
 { -0.033 { -0.072 {
least squares autoce t 1 -0.013
 { -0.059 { -0.161 {
(RLS) autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.012
 { -0.046 { -0.110
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.013
 { -0.047 { -0.172
least absolute autoci t 1 -0.004
 { -0.033 { -0.043 {
value (LAV autoce t 1 -0.013
 { -0.060 { -0.171 {
aka MAD) autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.009
 { -0.042 { -0.080
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.013
 { -0.055 { -0.176
extended autoci t 1 -0.012
 { -0.047 { -0.162 {
sample up to autoce t 1 -0.011
 { -0.061 { -0.181 {
2003 autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.019
 { -0.064 { -0.209
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.015
 { -0.054 { -0.183
importer is autoci t 1 -0.005
 { -0.045 { -0.088 {
developing autoce t 1 -0.021
 { -0.083 { -0.289 {
autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.015
 { -0.072 { -0.166
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.020
 { -0.066 { -0.282
exporter is autoci t 1 -0.020
 { -0.051 { -0.247 {
developing autoce t 1 -0.002 { -0.038
 { -0.070 {
autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.024
 { -0.070 { -0.306
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.004
 { -0.030 { -0.075
Instrumental autoci t 1 -0.048
 { -0.265 { -0.757 {
Variables autoce t 1 -0.012 { -0.064 { -0.260 {
Sargan-Hansen 0.136 { 0.715 { 0.236 {
autoci (t-1{t-5) { -0.068
 { -0.367 { -1.004
autoce (t-1{t-5) { -0.010 { -0.116
 { -0.266
Sargan-Hansen { 0.041 { 0.106 { 0.126
Notes: See notes to Tables 1 and 3 for explanations on the autocracy data and the abreviations
used. Only the results for the autocracy variables are shown in the table. However, the base
specication is taken from Table 2. In the Instrumental Variables regressions Sargan-Hansen
reports the p-values for the test of overidentication. We instrument the autocracy variables by
average party age, amount of checks and balances as well as voting in line with the G7 in the
UN General assembly. The rst stage F-statistic, indicating the power of the instruments, easily
passes the threshold of 10 as proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) in all specications.
All regressions contain importer-, exporter- and time-specic xed eects all of which are signi-
cant at the 1% level.
// indicates signicance at the 10/5/1-% signicance level.
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Table 5: Denitions and Sources of Variables
Variable Description Source
nimp nominal imports in dollars (for 1962-2000) Feenstra (2000)
(for 2001-2003) Comtrade (2006)
de US GDP deator (2000 = 1) IMF (2005)
log of real imports ln (nimp/de) own calculations
Polity IV? inverse of \polity2" indicator: 1 = most demo-
cratic, 21 = most autocratic
Gurr et al. (2003)
Freedom House? average of \political rights" and \civil liberties"
indicators: 1 = most democratic, 7 = most au-
tocratic
Freedom House
(2006)
Przeworski et al.? dummy variable taking the value of 1 for auto-
cratic states
Alvarez et al. (1996);
Przeworski et al.
(2000); Cheibub and
Gandhi (2004)
log GDP? ln (GDP) (constant 2000 US$) World Bank (2006)
landlocked dummy for at least one trading partner being
landlocked
CEPII (2006)
common language dummy for both trading partners sharing an of-
cial language
CEPII (2006)
common border dummy for common border CEPII (2006)
colonial ties dummy for pairs ever in colonial relationship CEPII (2006)
common colonizer dummy for common colonizer post 1945 CEPII (2006)
colony post 1945 dummy for pairs in colonial relationship post
1945
CEPII (2006)
same country 1 if countries were or are the same country CEPII (2006)
log distance ln of simple distance (most populated cities, km) CEPII (2006)
restriction index? sub-index economic restrictions of the KOF In-
dex of Globalization; combines data on hidden
import barriers, mean tari rate, taxes on inter-
national trade (in percent of current revenue)
and capital account restrictions
Dreher (2006)
log GDP per capita? ln (GDP/population) (constant 2000 US$) World Bank (2006)
log population ln (total population) World Bank (2006)
common currency dummy for pairs with a common currency Rose (2004)
generalized system
of preferences
dummy for pairs with a generalized system of
preferences (GSP)
Rose (2004)
regional trade agree-
ment
dummy for pairs that are a member of the same
regional trade agreement
Rose (2004)
WTO membership? dummy for WTO/GATT members WTO (2007)
? for these variables i and e indicate the values of an importing and exporting country, respectively.
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